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I. INTRODUCTION We consider a random graph where nodes denote agents and the edges denote interactions between them. A set of fixed point (FP) equations describe certain performance measure of the agents. The performance of each agent is influenced by aggregate of the performance of its neighbours, with the aggregate defined using the random edges. For each realization of the random quantities describing the system, there is one deterministic FP equation. The main aim is to study these FPs, asymptotically as the number of agents increase. As an example application we consider a financial network with a given liability graph, where investors/organizations are the nodes and the edges represent the liabilities. The network is affected by individual/common random economic shocks received by the agents. The amount cleared (full/fraction of liability) by an agent depends upon: a) the shocks it receives; and b) the amount of liability cleared by the other agents.
Random fixed points (FPs) are generalization of classical deterministic FPs, and arise when one considers systems with uncertainty. Broadly two types of such FPs have been studied in the literature. There is considerable literature that considers stochastic FP equations on the space of probability distributions (e.g., [1] , [2] ). These equations typically arise as a limit of some iterative schemes, or as asymptotic (stationary) distribution of stochastic systems. Alternatively, one might be interested in sample wise FPs (e.g., [3] , [4] ). Our focus in this paper is on the second type of equations, defined in almost sure sense. Current literature primarily considers the existence of measurable FP solutions, given the existence of sample wise FP solutions (e.g., [3] , [4] ). In [4] (and reference therein) authors consider the idea of random proximity points.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no (common) techniques that provide 'good' solutions to (even for some special type of) these FP equations. We consider the situations, in which the performance of an agent is influenced only by the aggregate performance of its neighbours, and provide a procedure to compute the approximate almost sure solutions. The solution of the random FPs converge to that of a limit system, under certain conditions. The performance of the agents in the limit system, depends upon finitely many 'aggregate' limits. For some examples, closed form expressions are derived for solutions of the limit system.
The mean field theory primarily deals with a system of large number of agents, wherein the state/behaviour of an individual agent is influenced by its own (previous) state and the mean (aggregate) field seen by it (e.g., [5] and reference therein). The theory shows the convergence of the state trajectories as well as the stationary (time limit) distributions of the original system towards that of a limit deterministic system. The stationary distribution can be described by FP equations in the space of distributions (e.g., [5] ). As opposed to that, we consider a set of FP equations, which are defined in almost sure (a.s.) sense and which depend upon the realization-wise 'mean' performance. We consider FP equations with possibly multiple solutions. Any sequence of the chosen FPs, converges to the unique FP of the limit system.
We apply our results to study the systemic risk in a large financial network. The institutions borrow/lend money from/to other institutions, and will have to clear their obligations at a later time. These systems are subjected to economic shocks, because of which some entities default (do not clear their obligations). Because of interdependencies, this can lead to further defaults and the cascade of these reactions can lead to the (partial/full) collapse of the system. After the financial crisis of 2007-2008, there is a surge of activity towards studying systemic risk (e.g., [9] , [8] , [10] ). The focus in these papers has been on several aspects including, measures to capture systemic risk, influence of network structure on systemic risk, phase transitions, and etc. These papers primarily discuss homogeneous systems, although heterogeneity is a crucial feature of real world networks. As already mentioned, the clearing vectors are represented by FP equations and may have multiple FP solutions. Thus our asymptotic solution can be useful.
We consider one stylized example of heterogeneous financial network, that of one big bank and numerous small banks. Our key contribution is that we develop a methodology to arrive at simplified asymptotic representation to large bank networks. This allows easy resolution of many practical what-if scenarios. For instance, in a simple framework we observe that having a big bank in an economy well connected to the small banks can stabilize the small banks as well as the big bank. We consider a conditional analysis, conditioned on the shocks to the big bank. There exists a range of the parameters describing connectivity between the big bank and small banks for which the system behaves the best: the fraction of defaults is minimum and the conditional surplus is the best. The proposed methodology can be similarly used to provide insights into many other practical scenarios. We hope to analyze these in future.
To summarise, our analysis helps identify important patterns in a complex structure, since the structure simplifies with large number of constituents.
II. SYSTEM MODEL Consider a random graph with (n + 1) vertices {1, 2, · · · , n, b} whose directed edges, given by random weights {W i,j }, represent the influence factors. The node b is a 'big node', and is highly influential. There is an edge between any two of the 'small' nodes (nodes in {1, 2, · · · , n}) with probability p ss independently of the others and let {I i,j } i≤n,j≤n be the corresponding indicators. Then the weights from small node j to big node or small node j are the respective fractions 1 defined by:
where {η , where {η bs j } are again IID random variables. We are interested in performance measures {X i } of the small nodes and X b of b-node, which depend upon the weighted ({W i,j }) average of the performance of others. The aggregate performance seen respectively by small node i and b-node equals:
The performance of each node depends upon these aggregates, and hence individual performance of the nodes can be described using fixed point (FP) equations.
The following FP equations (in R n+1 ) constructed using functions (f s , f b ) and weighted averages {X s i } i ,X b , describe the individual performance measures:
where: a) {G i } is an IID sequence influencing the performance; and b) X b the performance of b-node is defined per small node (performance divided by n).
For any n, define the mapping
Observe that the fixed points of the above provide the FPs of the random operator (3)-(4). We assume that: A.1 The functions f s , f b are non-negative, continuous and are bounded by an y < ∞,
Under the above assumption, by well known Brouwers fixed point theorem, FP solution exists for almost all realizations of {G i }, {W j,i } and for any x b . Thus we have a random (measurable) FP (X * , X * b ) for each n for the random operator (3)-(4) (see [3] ). The precise details are as Lemma 1 of [7] .
Assumptions on the graph structure: The number of nodes influencing any given node, grows asymptotically linearly for almost all sample paths:
A.2 Consider p ss > 0, and only graphs for which, In Theorem 1 (given below), we will show that the aggregate vectors {X s i } (see (1)- (2)) satisfy a kind of law of large numbers (LLN) under A.2, even when they are not independent (will not even be Markovian). This facilitates a simplified asymptotic analysis.
A. Aggregate fixed points
One can rewrite the fixed point equations for the weighted averages {X s i } i ,X b and we begin with their analysis. Define the following random variables,
that depend upon real constants (x, x b ) and assume:
Consider the following operators on infinite sequence space 2 s ∞ , one for each n:
It is clear that the fixed points of the above operators equal the aggregate vectors, ({X
We will show that the fixed point of this operator equals that of a 'limit' system and that the FPs of the original system converge towards these FPs. Recall that the weights, i W j,i + W j,b = 1 for any i. Thus we require the FP of the operator:
with s ∞ as defined in footnote 2. Idea is to derive a kind of mean field analysis where the aggregates will be approximated by their expected values.
With a constant sequence, i.e., ifx = (x,x, · · · ) the limit superiors in the definition of the limit systemf (6)) 2 Here s ∞ is the space (subset) of bounded sequences equipped with l ∞ norm |x|∞ := sup i |x i |,
In the above, E X,Y represents the expectation with respect to X, Y . The random variables are IID and hence the first equation is the same function for all i. By Theorem 1, given below, one such constant sequence would be the almost sure limit of the solutions of the aggregate fixed point equations (6) . Thus one will have to solve a two-dimensional fixed point equation corresponding to the above function (8) . And then random fixed points (3)-(4) are asymptotically independent depending upon the other nodes only via the aggregate fixed point, as given by the theorem below (proof is in [7] ).
The aggregates of the random system, which are FPs of (5)
where (x
is the FP of the limit system given by (8) . Further (any sequence of) FPs of the original system (3)-(4) converge:
Thus the fixed points of the finite n system converge to that of the limit system. The fixed points are asymptotically independent and depend upon the other nodes only via an almost sure constantx ∞ * i which is common for all i. Another important point is that, the aggregate fixed points need not be unique, however any sequence of fixed points (one for each n) converges towards that of the limit system (when it has unique fixed point).
More Remarks: 1) The result does not depend upon the precise probability p ss of the connection between small nodes. It only requires that p ss > 0; 2) It is straight forward to generalize to the case where one may have finite number of groups of small nodes, nodes within a group are identical stochastically (identical {G i }, {η sb i } and {η bs i }), and any typical small node can be of group i with probability q i independent of others. With this, one can study a wider variety of heterogeneous situations, e.g., a financial network with many big and small banks.
III. FINANCIAL NETWORK We study a complex heterogeneous financial network by approximating it with a simpler limiting system using Theorem 1. Consider a huge financial network with n small banks (SBs) and one big bank (BB). The BB has a bigger investor base and may be in a position to lend to the SBs to help run their local operations. SBs are also liable to each other, this may be due to direct lending between them, as well as credit instruments between them that create liabilities. All the SBs, have same initial wealth and are subject to identical economic shocks and hence are similar in nature.
We consider these banks in a three period framework. At T=0 small banks invest in the external economy, e.g., give loans to corporate projects. At this time they may take up loans from the big bank as well as from other small banks towards this investment. They can also lend to some other small banks. Similarly, the big bank also invests in the external economy and lends capital to small banks. The banks receive returns from these investments in two instalments, one (usually a smaller amount) at time T = 1 and another at time T = 2.
At time T = 1, the banks use the returns from their investments, to clear their obligations (e.g., [10] , [8] ). But the investments are risky, there are chances of economic shocks, the returns might be lower than anticipated, because of which some banks may not be able to (fully/partially) pay the liability. We say these banks defaulted. The defaulted banks increase the shocks to other connected banks, because of which we may have more defaults. And this can continue and the system can 'collapse'. Systemic risk precisely studies these aspects.
The defaulted banks, at time T = 1, break their bonds (external investments) to clear their obligations. If a bank does not face a liquidity crunch at T = 1, then it receives a return of amount (say) A at T = 2. On the other hand if it needs funding at T = 1 to prevent default, it liquidates its invests and receives nothing at T = 2 but receives ρA at T = 1 (for some 0 < ρ < 1).
Our main aim is to study the influence of economic shocks on the stability of the network, wherein stability is understood in terms of the fraction of defaults, or in terms of the expected surplus after the shocks etc., for a given realization of the shocks.
Throughout the paper, we discuss only the values of the various financial ingredients at time T = 1, scaled up appropriately from other time points, e.g., the ones at time T = 0. Also all the big bank quantities are represented per SB, i.e., after dividing by n.
Shocks: The banks are subject to a common shock Z c that results in losses in all banks (for instance, collapsing of housing market) as well as idiosyncratic shocks that may be due to local economic or operational reasons. For convenience and in accordance with the literature we model the idiosyncratic shocks {Z s i } i as Bernoulli random variables that take value with probability w and 0 with the remaining probability.
Let K s and K b represent the respective returns at T = 1 with zero shocks, if an SB and BB invest all their initial wealth in external investments. Thus K s , K b are proportional to their respective initial wealth. So, SB i receives ν(K s − Z s i − Z c ) + at time T = 1 after shocks, in case it invested ν times its initial wealth in external investments. In a similar way, BB receives
+ , if it invested ν b times its initial wealth in external investments: a) the BB's sensitivity to the common shock is given by δ > 0, so that it loses amount δZ c as a result of common shock of magnitude Z c ; and b) Z b is its idiosyncratic shock. The intent of these shocks is to illustrate a stressed economic scenario -if the economy suffers a common shock of Z c magnitude, and the idiosyncratic shocks are distributed as above, how does the financial network behave as a function of the underlying connectivity structure.
Liabilities: We model the liabilities of the financial network using a directed weighted graph, with the banks as the nodes and the weighted edges represent the liability fractions and directions. Let Y represent the total liability of any SB. It is distributed to other banks as follows. The weight W i,j := l i,j /Y represents the fraction, and, l i,j the amount the bank i is liable to bank j.
is the liability towards BB. A SB is liable to another SB with probability p ss > 0. Let I i,j be 1 if SB i is liable to SB j, and, then the fractions of liability are:
For simplicity we provide analysis when the rate of interest on liabilities between the two time periods equals the rate of upward movement (i.e., one with zero shocks) in external investment.
Portfolio selection The BB invests ν b fraction of its initial wealth in external investments, and it lends the remaining to the SBs. Then this investment is proportional 3 to ν b K b . And hence (all the values as at T = 1):
The SBs invest their entire initial wealth, plus the borrowed money (Y ) and minus the money lend: say they invest ν times their initial wealth. Then the invested amount is proportional to νK s and hence:
The total claims of SB i, almost surely equal (by A.2):
Similarly total claims (per SB) of big bank converge to Y p sb almost surely (a.s.). Thus we have: 3 Recall K b is proportional to its initial wealth and note ν b K b would also equal the return at T = 1 with zero shocks
Clearing Vector: Let X s i represent the maximum possible part of the total liability, eventually cleared by SB i. The vector {X s i } i is referred to as clearing vector (e.g., [10] , [8] ) and we make the following commonly made 'Limited liability and proportionality assumption' (as in [10] , [8] etc.) for computing the same.
When a bank (say bank i) defaults, it may not be able to clear its liabilities completely. However it repays the maximum possible, and the amount cleared to another bank (say bank j) is proportional to the fraction W i,j . Thus SB i receives (its total claim) 
and if this amount is less than Y it breaks its bonds which are supposed to mature at T = 2. Thus, in all, the total amount cleared by SB i equals,
where A s is the amount returned at T = 2, when SB invests all its initial wealth.
The value of the portfolio of BB at time T = 1 depends upon the clearing vectors of SBs and should equal:
If many SBs default and or if the outside investment receive huge shocks, the above is negative, the BB will not be able to pay its taxes v b , and will break its bond to clear the same. Thus the value at T = 1 actually equals:
The system ({X 
, and
To keep the notation simple, we consider Y , K s , K b ν, ν b as constant terms, one can easily generalize to random quantities. Once these fixed point equations are solved, the clearing vectors are approximately given by (9) of Theorem 1. These are asymptotically independent, as now the aggregatesX s i are almost sure constants and are common for all i. Thus almost surely as n → ∞:
A. Performance measures to study systemic risk
Once the fixed points (12)-(13) are computed for each pair of shock realizations (z c , z b ), one can obtain various performance measures as below: Fraction of defaults: The fraction of SBs that defaulted (by bounded convergence theorem and Theorem 1) and the indicator that the BB defaults asymptotically equal:
The fraction of defaulted SBs for almost all realizations of SB shocks {Z s i } i equal the above constant. Same is the case for BB. These constants, however, depend upon the realization of the BB and common shock (z b , z c ).
Expected surplus: is the total income of the network (BB plus SBs), after clearing the liabilities and taxes, divided by n. This also includes the returns obtained after the maturity of the bonds. The banks obtain this amount at T = 2, however, we consider the value of this return as at time T = 1. We define the following as the expected surplus (inspired by [10] , [8] and see (11)):
B. Analysis
We obtain the performance measures of the financial network for any given realization of SB shocks {Z s i } i . As already mentioned, these measures are a.s. constants, which depend only upon realizations (z c , z b ). Towards this, first fix a realization (z c , z b ), and define the following (for any x):
In the following, we derive the required performance, by solving the fixed point equations of the previous subsection in various regimes.
Resilience region: no banks fail, i.e., P s D = 0: We begin with finding the range of p sb for which zero SBs default. We call this regime as 'Resilience region', as the SBs do not default in spite of receiving shocks. Clearly in this regime θ = Y . This region ends when the failure occurs in the most vulnerable condition, i.e., when the banks with shock fail. From (13), this happens when (16)). This is equivalent to (see (10) ):
Thus zero banks fails if and only if p sb is less than the above threshold. Once p sb is above the threshold, atleast one set of banks default. By the condition mentioned above, these are the banks (w fraction of them) that received non-zero shock.
Only banks with shocks default, i.e., P s D = w: First the following fixed point equation is solved to compute the average clearing vector (using (13)):
Now this regime lasts till the following:
Systemic Risk Event: Some SBs (asymptotically w fraction of them) receive non-zero shock ( ) while others do not. The banks with shocks might default, further the shocks can percolate through the network because of liability connections, and, can cause others to default. We say the system is in systemic risk event, when all the banks default, even when only a strict fraction (less than one) of them receive shocks. From (19) the systemic risk event is possible, for some p sb , only when
This can define an important phase transition result in term of various parameters (e.g., shock size , connection parameter p sb etc.).
When all the banks default, i.e., P s D = 1: In this case θ solves the following equation:
The fraction of defaults, θ andx ∞ * = θ(1 − p sb ) are obtained using:
And then the BB defaults when (see (13))
We would like to reiterate that all the results, of this sub-section, are the same for all-most all realizations of idiosyncratic shocks of SBs {Z s i } i , but, however depend upon the realizations (z c , z b ).
C. Theoretical and Numerical Observations
One can analyze the network predominantly using the analysis (e.g., bounds on connection parameter p sb for various phenomenon) derived in previous sub-section itself. However the expressions (provided in [7] ) for expected surplus (conditioned on (Z c , Z b )) are complicated and hence we consider some numerical example in Figures 1-2 . The settings of the example are provided in the figures itself. We make the following observations: a) The fraction of SBs that default, P s D , can only degrade with increase in connection parameter p sb (see (21)). This is also evident from the two figures. b) However the surplus, conditioned on Z c , Z b , improves for small p sb . There exists an optimal connection parameter p sb for which the surplus is the best. With increased p sb the liability of the SBs (Y p sb ) increases. In the event of large shocks, as the size of liabilities increase, the chances of default increases for SBs. On the other hand, with increase in liability (i.e., with increase in p sb ) the external investments by SBs also increase. So, as long as the SBs survive (without breaking bonds) at T = 1, the surplus is significant (and is increasing with p sb ) because of the returns anticipated at T = 2. The two dotted vertical lines, in the right sub-figures of Figures  1-2 , show the respective p sb thresholds beyond which the bonds are broken for SBs with 0 and shocks. The second vertical line (at 0.382 and 0.691 respectively in the two figures) is the p sb for which the conditional expected surplus of the SBs is the best. Using similar analysis as in previous sub-section (as in equation (19) this threshold satisfies the following equation:
.
c) The BB can default with small values of connection parameter p sb when its shocks (common shock z c or z b ) are large. However as connection improves, eventually the BB does not default (see (22) . This again reflects in the surplus of BB. One can also observe it in Figure 1 .
d) The systemic risk event, i.e., the possibility of all SBs defaulting at some p sb , is possible only when the common shock z c is sufficiently big. The idiosyncratic shocks ( in this example) does not lead to this (see equation 20 and observe that w, the fraction of banks with shocks, is typically small). This aspect is also demonstrated in Figure 1 . To summarize, the banks (BB as well as SBs) improve with liability connection between them, when they face large shocks. Interestingly in many cases (Figure 1) , even in spite of large shocks, both BB and SBs improve their (conditional) surplus. Another important observation is that the above mentioned stability details of the network does not depend upon the exact value of p ss , the inter SB liability connection parameter. It only requires that p ss > 0, and this is because the banks observe a 'mean field' owing to large number of SBs. CONCLUSIONS We considered a random graph, with edges representing the influence factors between a big (highly influential) node and numerous small nodes. The performance/status of individual nodes is resultant of these influences, which are represented by fixed point (FP) equations. We showed that the solution of the random FP equations converge almost surely to that of a limit system and these solutions are asymptotically independent. One may have multiple solutions for finite graphs, however any sequence of them converge to the unique FP of the limit system (if it has unique FP). Thus we have a procedure to solve the large dimensional FP equations, using mean-field kind of techniques. The proposed solution requires solving of 'aggregate' FPs in a much smaller dimensional space and is accurate asymptotically.
We study an example heterogeneous financial network with one big bank and many small banks. We have reduced the overall economy problem in this set-up to a two node problem -one big bank and one aggregate SB, thus facilitating big picture analysis. We observe some interesting phase transitions, one can easily study the nature of these phase transitions using the approximate solutions of the involved FPs. We observe that connection to big bank helps all the banks when the shocks are big, however there exists an optimal connection parameter which depends upon the magnitude of the common shock and the big bank shock. We also observe that network is more robust towards size of shocks of the small banks, and is more sensitive towards common and big bank shocks.
These observations could be specific to the example considered by us, however we now have a procedure to study complex networks and a more elaborate study would help us derive more concrete observations. One can easily generalize the results by relaxing many of the assumptions, one can apply this approach to more applications and these two would be the topics of future interest.
